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A B S T R A C T
How do States ‘legitimize’ their non-ratification of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees? This article 
examines the case of Lebanon, a country frequently hailed by the international community 
for its generosity towards refugees, and currently hosting the highest number of refugees 
in the world in proportion to its population size. While Lebanon engaged actively in the 
establishment of the international refugee regime, it has long insisted that it is not a coun-
try of asylum and steadfastly rejects ratification of the major refugee law instruments.
Based on 10 months of field research, this article makes four arguments as to why 
Lebanon continues to resist ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol. 
First, it argues that there is a widespread and real, or simply politically expedient, uncer-
tainty as to the obligations that come with the Convention. This includes a belief that the 
Convention requires that Lebanon allow for the permanent settlement of refugees on its 
territory. Secondly, it argues that the responsibility-shift for refugees to third parties such 
as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees brings about obvious advan-
tages for Lebanon, and has made it less inclined to become a party to the Convention. 
Thirdly, it argues that the ‘good-neighbourliness’ principle between Arab countries holds 
that Lebanon should not employ the term ‘refugee’ because doing so would put the State 
into positions that could violate the good neighbour principle; essentially, ratifying the 
Convention would entail a duty to recognize certain forced migrants as refugees. Finally, 
the article argues that many Lebanese government officials and policymakers consider 
Lebanon’s accession to the Convention redundant for three key reasons. First, Lebanon 
applies the provisions of the Convention and Protocol on a voluntary basis, so that 
there is no need for ratification; secondly, Lebanon already has human rights obligations 
towards refugees on its territory by virtue of its membership of the United Nations and its 
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ratification of a number of core human rights instruments; and, thirdly, due to the ‘crisis’ in 
international refugee law, in which many States appear to reject the Convention altogether, 
Lebanese decision makers are now questioning the relevance of these instruments.
1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Refugee Convention) are the two primary 
international legal instruments that provide for the protection of the world’s refugees. 
However, in the Middle East, few States have acceded to these instruments, and no 
regional refugee regime such as those found in Africa or Latin America exists.1 This is 
seemingly paradoxical for a region in which forced migration has long been a standard 
element of life, and where refugees may even be seen as a ‘defining feature’.2
In the literature, significant work has been done to explain Middle Eastern States’ 
non-commitment to international refugee law.3 However, few studies have explored the 
particular circumstances of any one of these States.4 It is arguable that the reasons for 
non-accession to the Convention vary between States, and, although some explana-
tions may be valid throughout the region, important nuances may be lost by viewing 
these States as a group. This article intends to address this gap in the literature by pro-
viding an examination of the key arguments used by one of these States – Lebanon – to 
‘legitimize’ its rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Unlike many other States in the region, Lebanon engaged actively in the establish-
ment of the international refugee regime. In addition, while many refugee populations 
in Lebanon have historically been marginalized and mistreated,5 the international com-
munity has often lauded the country’s approach to refugees. In 2014, for example, the 
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General stated that, ‘Lebanon is a key pillar in the 
international framework for the protection of Syrian refugees, and without it, that en-
tire system would collapse’.6 Indeed, a strong national myth in Lebanon identifies it as 
the cradle of international human rights, and the country, with its perceived geography, 
1 Although attempts were made in 1992 with the drafting of the Declaration of Refugees and 
Displaced Persons in the Arab World. In the end, the Declaration has failed to be influential, 
endorsed only by Egypt.
2 R Zaiotti, ‘Dealing with Non-Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East: Policies and Practices in 
an Uncertain Environment’ (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 333, 333. See also 
D Chatty, Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press 
2010).
3 See generally D Stevens, ‘Legal Status, Labelling, and Protection: The Case of Iraqi “Refugees” 
in Jordan’ (2013) 25 International Journal of Refugee Law 1; Zaiotti (n 2); M Kagan, ‘The UN 
“Surrogate State” and the Foundation of Refugee Policy in the Middle East’ (2012) 18 University 
of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 307.
4 For an important exception, see Stevens (n 3).
5 N Erakat, ‘Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during 
Secondary Forced Displacement’ (2014) 26 International Journal of Refugee Law 581; F De Bel 
Air, ‘Migration Profile: Lebanon’ (European University Institute, 2017/12) 4.
6 ‘Lebanon Cannot Bear Brunt of Syrian Refugee Crisis Alone, UN Relief Official Warns’ (UN 
News Centre, 18 March 2014).
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diversity, freedom, and openness, is widely believed to have historically attracted those 
seeking refuge from persecution.7 Today, Lebanon hosts the highest number of refu-
gees in the world in proportion to its estimated population size of 6.2 million.8 With 
1,011,366 registered Syrian refugees in December 2016, Syrians represent the vast ma-
jority of refugees in the country.9 There are also an estimated 504,000 Palestine refugees 
registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and 42,000 
Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS), in addition to a mere 16,000 from countries such 
as Ethiopia, Iraq, and Sudan.10
Despite these large numbers, the Lebanese government insists that it is not a coun-
try of asylum, and rejects, in principle, the local integration of refugees. This approach 
can be traced back to the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 (as amended in 1990), which 
appears to prohibit any permanent settlement of foreigners. It is also cemented in the 
key document laying out the UN and government response to the country’s Syrian refu-
gee presence, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), which states that: ‘Lebanon 
is neither a country of asylum, nor a final destination for refugees, let alone a country 
of resettlement’.11
The unwillingness to host refugees is furthermore reflected in the lack of formal 
domestic refugee legislation. Asylum issues are instead attended to through immigra-
tion laws. The 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and 
their Exit from the Country12 contains six articles relating to asylum. The asylum provi-
sions in the 1962 Law on Entry and Exit have only been applied once since the end of 
7 See generally I Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon (Routledge 2014); W Harris, The 
New Face of Lebanon: History’s Revenge (Markus Wiener Publishers 2006).
8 CIA, The World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> 
accessed 24 October 2016. This figure is nevertheless disputed. For a discussion, see De Bel Air 
(n 5) 1.
9 The true number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is nevertheless disputed, following the govern-
ment’s decision in May 2015 to suspend UNHCR’s registration of Syrian refugees. M Janmyr, 
‘Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’ (2016) 35 Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 58, 66.
10 UNHCR, ‘The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’ (2016) 2 <http://www.refworld.
org/pdfid/56cc95484.pdf> accessed 29 May 2017. Other sources suggest that the number of 
Palestine refugees in Lebanon may be considerably lower; while 400,000 refugees were registered 
with UNRWA in 2010, a survey that same year estimated that the number of Palestine refugees 
effectively residing in the country was only 260,000 to 280,000. See J Chaaban and others, 
‘Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’ (American University of Beirut 
(AUB) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) 2010) x <https://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011012074253.pdf> accessed 29 May 
2017.
11 UNHCR and Government of Lebanon, ‘Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015–2016’ (2014) 
(LCRP) <http://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-crisis-response-plan-2015-16-year-two> 
accessed 31 October 2016.
12 Liban: Loi du 1962 réglementant l’entrée et le séjour des étrangers au Liban ainsi que leur sortie de 
ce pays. Bulletin de Législation Libanaise (Journal Officiel) No 28–1962 (10 July 1962) <https://
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f30.html> accessed 24 October 2016.
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the civil war in 1991, in a highly politicized case where a member of the Japanese Red 
Army received asylum in 2001.13 Refugees have thus been provided with no other sta-
tus than that afforded to foreign nationals in general, causing many to live ‘illegally’ in 
the country and consequently under extremely harsh and marginalized conditions.14
This seemingly paradoxical and complex background arguably warrants examin-
ation of the particular reasons why Lebanon has remained outside the formal inter-
national refugee regime, despite having a key role in its establishment and the fact that it 
currently hosts an unprecedented number of refugees. This article seeks to discuss how 
Lebanon officially legitimizes its non-ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention.15 It 
makes four arguments as to why Lebanon continues to resist ratification. First, there 
is widespread, real, or simply politically expedient, uncertainty as to the obligations 
that come with the Convention, including a belief that the Convention would require 
Lebanon to allow the permanent settlement of refugees on its territory. Its history with 
Palestine refugees is testament to the considerable ideological obstacles to any local 
integration or naturalization (‘tawteen’) of foreigners.
Secondly, the responsibility-shift for refugees to third parties such as the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has obvious advantages for 
Lebanon, and has made it less inclined to become a party to the Convention. There is a 
general belief that, should Lebanon ratify the Convention, it would have to bear more 
of the ‘burden’. Thirdly, the ‘good-neighbourliness’ argument between Arab countries 
holds that Lebanon should not employ the term ‘refugee’, since to do so would put 
the State in positions that could violate the good neighbour principle. Ratifying the 
Convention would, in essence, entail a duty to recognize certain forced migrants as 
refugees. Finally, it argues that many Lebanese government officials and policymakers 
consider Lebanon’s accession to the Convention to be redundant.
The article is based on 10 months of fieldwork in Lebanon in 2015 and 2016, 
including interviews with key informants in the UN, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and government agencies. A total of 30 key informants, selected through 
chain sampling, were interviewed. This involved well-informed individuals iden-
tifying other informants with knowledge of Lebanon’s ratification of international 
instruments, and/or refugees. While all interviews were confidential, to maintain the 
anonymity of the sources, interviewees included individuals from national and inter-
national NGOs, as well as from UNHCR and other UN agencies. The nine informants 
in government agencies included government advisers from four ministries controlled 
by different political parties. In addition, the article is based on an analysis of historical 
and contemporary legal materials and policies.
13 JF Burns, ‘Lebanon Grants Political Asylum to 1 of 5 Japan Terrorists’ New York Times (18 
March  2000)  <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/18/world/lebanon-grants-political-asylum-
to-1-of-5-japan-terrorists.html> accessed 26 May 2017.
14 Janmyr (n 9).
15 While this article considers the efforts of UN bodies to convince Lebanon to accede to the 1951 
Refugee Convention, comprehensive examination of domestic mobilization efforts and discus-
sions by and among Lebanese civil society on this topic falls outside its scope. Lebanon has a 
vibrant civil society that has increasingly engaged with the country’s refugee policies. Of these, 
Frontiers Ruwad Association is perhaps the most well known.
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The article is divided into five main parts. Following this introduction, the article 
briefly explores Lebanon’s role in the origins of international refugee law, before exam-
ining the efforts that have been made at the international level to persuade it to ratify 
the Convention. The main part of the article provides, in part 4, an explanation of why 
Lebanon remains a non-party to the Convention: uncertainty about Convention obli-
gations, third-party surrogacy, good-neighbourliness, and the perceived redundancy of 
the Convention. In the final section, brief conclusions are drawn.
2 .  L E B A N O N  A N D  T H E  O R I G I N S  O F  I N T E R N AT I O N A L 
R E F U G E E   L AW
Unlike most other Middle Eastern States, Lebanon played a key role in the foundation 
of international refugee law.16 First, it was one of only 20 States that formed the commit-
tee appointed by the UN General Assembly, in February 1946, to lay the basis for the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO). In December of that year, the IRO’s pro-
posed mandate, drafted in part by Lebanon, was adopted by the General Assembly.17 
Following this, in 1949, Lebanon participated in creating UNHCR. Records of the 
drafting process reveal that Lebanon was actively engaged in, among other things, advo-
cating for a broad definition of a refugee. As its representative argued at the time, ‘there 
were new categories of refugees who did not come under the protection of the IRO; for 
example those in Greece, Pakistan, India and China … any resolution the Committee 
adopted should establish the High Commissioner as the protector of all refugees’.18 In 
the end, however, Lebanon voted in favour of a Joint Resolution establishing UNHCR 
with a view to identify and assist refugees within Europe.19
The drafting process of the 1951 Convention began with General Assembly 
Resolution 8(I) of 12 February 1946 and was concluded when the UN Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries adopted the treaty on 28 July 1951. However, the largest and most inten-
sive parts of the drafting process took place in 1950 and 1951.20 Lebanon participated in 
certain aspects of this process, in addition to engaging in the largely concurrent drafting 
process of the UNHCR Statute. It was here that it, together with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
issued a joint resolution on behalf of Palestine refugees. It argued that the ‘definition of 
the term “refugee” adopted by the Economic and Social Council [was] unduly restrict-
ive, because it was limited in time and space and omitted certain categories of refugees’.21 
16 It is, nevertheless, worth noting that Egypt, Turkey, and Israel participated in the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries.
17 SE Davies, Legitimising Rejection: International Refugee Law in Southeast Asia (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2008).
18 UNGA, Official Records of the Third Committee, Fourth Session, 259th Meeting, 11 November 
1949, 128 (emphasis added).
19 UNGA, Official Records of the Third Committee, Fourth Session, 265th Meeting, 18 November 
1949, 150.
20 T Einarsen, ‘Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol’ in A Zimmermann, 
F Machts, and J Dörschner (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 
1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011) 37.
21 UNGA, Official Records of the Third Committee, Fifth Session, 328th Meeting, 27 November 
1950, 358.
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They were also critical of a United Kingdom resolution, which would ‘submerge in the 
general mass of refugees certain groups which were the particular concern of the General 
Assembly and the right of which to repatriation had already been recognized by General 
Assembly Resolutions’.22 The group they were referring to was the Palestine refugee popu-
lation. Thus, they successfully demanded that ‘the mandate of the High Commissioner’s 
Office shall not extend to categories of refugees at present placed under the competence 
of other organs or agencies of the United Nations’.23
These States were specifically referring to the United Nations Relief and Work 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has provided sup-
port to Palestine refugees since 1949. It is nevertheless interesting to note in this regard 
that the protracted Palestinian issue, which deems it necessary to retain the special sta-
tus of Palestine refugees rather than subject them to the prevailing norms of resettle-
ment or local integration, remains the most cited reason for the continued refusal by 
many States in the Middle East to sign the Convention. Thus, although the final text 
of the Convention explicitly addresses the concerns of these States with regard to the 
Palestinian issue, many Middle Eastern States still refuse to accede.24
The final draft of the 1951 Convention was not passed until it was presented at the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in July 1951. After having been an active participant in 
forming the international refugee regime following the Second World War, Lebanon 
did not attend this vital conference, at which the Convention was unanimously adopted. 
Nor did countries such as Brazil, China, and India, which had all previously spoken 
out against aspects of the Convention and Statute.25 Lebanon, however, opposed the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries itself, arguing that the General Assembly should adopt 
the text of the Convention.26 Lebanon’s voluntary absence from the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries thus appears to have had little to do with any opposition to the form 
or content of the Convention and Protocol.
In November 1957, the General Assembly took the decision to create UNHCR’s 
Executive Committee. Lebanon has been a member of this body since 1963 – the same 
year that UNHCR first established its presence on Lebanese soil.27 Membership of this 
Committee requires that States must be a member of the UN or of one of its specialized 
agencies; be elected by the Economic and Social Council; represent the widest possible 
geographical basis; and have a demonstrable interest in and devotion to the solution 
of the refugee problem.28 Lebanon’s active engagement during the early stages of the 
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
24 See UNHCR, ‘Revised Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees’ (2009) <http://www.refworld.org/
docid/4add77d42.html> accessed 31 October 2016.
25 Davies (n 17).
26 UNGA, Official Records of the Third Committee, Fifth Session, 330th Meeting, 30 November 
1950, 371; UNGA, Official Records of the Third Committee, Fifth Session, 332nd Meeting, 
1 December 1950, 378, 380.
27 UNHCR, ‘ExCom Membership by Admission of Members’ <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/
scaf/574c362c4/excom-membership.html> accessed 24 October 2016.
28 UNHCR, ‘Background on the Executive Committee’ <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/
announce/3b4f09faa/background-executive-committee.html> accessed 24 October 2016.
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international refugee regime, as well as its complicated history of hosting Palestine refu-
gees, clearly demonstrates its interest in the refugee problem. Despite this, it may still 
appear peculiar that a non-party to the Convention is included in a Committee tasked 
to advise the High Commissioner ‘in the exercise of his functions under the Statute of 
his Office’ and to approve the High Commissioner’s assistance programmes.29
3 .  C A L L S  F O R  L E B A N O N ’ S  R AT I F I C AT I O N
Lebanon’s active participation in laying the foundations of the international refugee 
regime is contrasted with its unwillingness to formally bind itself to this same frame-
work. This section explores recent discussions regarding Lebanon’s potential accession 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which, quite surprisingly, have largely taken place 
outside the realm of UNHCR. With the notable exception of the negotiation of a 2003 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Lebanon’s General Security Office, dis-
cussed later, it is difficult to trace UNHCR’s diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the Lebanese 
government.
Working towards Lebanon’s accession to the Convention has never been an explicit 
objective identified in UNHCR’s Country Operations Plans,30 although, on occasion, 
these have acknowledged that Lebanon ‘has very strong reservations about acceding to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention’.31 In this regard, UNHCR has explained that:
undeniably, the presence of up to 400,000 Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s 
mandate is one of the principal reasons deterring the Lebanese authorities from 
accession to these refugee law instruments. Lebanon fears the potential local 
integration would upset the sensitive demographic and socio-economic balance 
in the country.32
Other reasons include security and economic considerations.33 In 2003, UNHCR also 
explained how:
UNHCR has acknowledged the fact that Lebanon’s accession to the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol is not an immediate option due to a variety 
of constraints faced by the GOL [Government of Lebanon]. Nevertheless, the 
29 ibid.
30 UNHCR, ‘Country Operations Plan 2002: Lebanon’ (1 December 2001) <http://www.refworld.
org/docid/3c639a7f4.html>; UNHCR, ‘Country Operations Plan 2004: Lebanon’ (1 September 
2003)  <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fd9c6a14.html>; UNHCR, ‘Country Operations 
Plan 2005: Lebanon’ (1 September 2004) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4159634c4.html>; 
UNHCR, ‘Country Operations Plan 2006: Lebanon’ (1 September 2005) <http://www.refworld.
org/docid/43327bde2.html>; UNHCR, ‘Country Operations Plan 2007: Lebanon’ (1 September 
2006)  <http://www.refworld.org/docid/45221e482.html>; UNHCR, ‘Country Operations 
Plan 2008: Lebanon’ (1 September 2007) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/47162496d.html> 
(all accessed 24 October 2016).
31 UNHCR, ‘Country Operations Plan 2006: Lebanon’ ibid.
32 ibid.
33 UNHCR ‘Country Operations Plan 2008: Lebanon’ (n 30).
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Office arduously worked with its government counterparts to reach an under-
standing that helps UNHCR implement its mandate, and at the same time helps 
the government to put in place the necessary protection infrastructure without 
having to formally accede to the Convention and Protocol.34
For reasons such as these, UNHCR has long focused on establishing an acceptable 
‘protection space’ for the country’s refugees, inter alia by ‘strengthening institutional 
support for protection and community-based protection’.35 This nevertheless includes 
training and outreach activities to disseminate knowledge of UNHCR’s mandate, refu-
gee and asylum law, and related issues, through, for example, workshops for university 
students, journalists, government officials, lawyers, judges, and prosecutors.36
However, it appears that discussions on the issue of Lebanon’s accession to the 
Convention have not been led by UNHCR. An examination of the engagement of the 
UN human rights bodies provides important insights into the sustained international 
pressure that has been placed on Lebanon. Most significant in this regard is the work of 
the Committees on the Convention on Ethnic and Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women (CEDAW), 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The following brief examin-
ation will show how the issue was first raised in the CRC Committee in 1996, how 
Lebanon appears to have considered accession in the mid-2000s, and how attempts to 
convince Lebanon to accede to the Convention have intensified in the past few years.
One of the most ardent proponents of Lebanon acceding to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention is the CRC Committee, which has raised the issue in all three of its 
Concluding Observations on Lebanon. During meetings in May 1996, Committee 
Member Thomas Hammarberg (Sweden) asked whether ‘the Lebanese Government 
intended to ratify the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol’.37 The Lebanese representative stalled in his response, explaining that he 
would send the ‘information requested by Mr. Hammarberg … to the Committee in 
writing’.38 While in its Concluding Observations the CRC Committee subsequently 
recommended that Lebanon consider the ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol,39 Lebanon avoided the issue entirely in its second report to 
the Committee, submitted in December 1997.40 The question was not raised during 
34 UNHCR ‘Country Operations Plan 2004: Lebanon’ (n 30).
35 UNHCR (Global Focus) <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2520?y=2016#year> accessed 24 
October 2016. For a critique of the notion of ‘protection space’, see generally M Jones, ‘Moving 
beyond Protection Space: Developing a Law of Asylum in South East Asia’ in S Kneebone, 
L Baldassar, and D Stevens (eds), Refugee Protection and the Role of Law: Conflicting Identities 
(Routledge 2014) 251.
36 UNHCR Country Operations Plans for Lebanon: 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2008 (n 30).
37 UN doc CRC/C/SR.291 (1996) para 34. Lebanon made no mention of its non-accession to the 
1951 Refugee Convention in its first report to the UN CRC in 1995. See UN doc CRC/C/8/
Add.23 (1995).
38 UN doc CRC/C/SR.291 (1996) para 44.
39 UN doc CRC/C/15/Add.54 (1996) para 41.
40 UN doc CRC/C/70/Add.8 (2000).
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the Committee’s meetings on Lebanon in January 2002,41 although in its Concluding 
Observations, one month later, the Committee reiterated its previous recommendation 
that Lebanon accede to the Convention and Protocol.42
Four years later, Lebanon submitted its third report to the CRC Committee, in 
which it not only emphasized its strengthened cooperation with UNHCR – exempli-
fied by the 2003 MoU between UNHCR and Lebanon’s General Security Office43 – but 
also explained its ‘delay’ in ratifying inter alia the 1951 Refugee Convention. Reference 
was made to the ‘complexity of the political situation relating to the issue of providing 
nationality to Palestinians in Lebanon, an issue unanimously refused by the Lebanese 
according to the documents of the national covenant, that was enacted at El Taef ’.44 
While these arguments will be considered later, it is important to note the significance 
of Lebanon using the word ‘delay’, as it indicates that, far from being a situation in dead-
lock, there had been at least some movement towards acknowledging the Convention 
in the years between Lebanon’s second and third reports to the CRC.
This development was clarified during the CRC’s consideration of Lebanon’s third 
report in May 2006.45 Responding to comments by a Committee Member who regret-
ted ‘that the fact that Lebanon had not ratified the Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees meant that children of refugees and unaccompanied minors were expelled, 
in violation of international law’,46 the Lebanese representative revealed plans for 
strengthening the country’s protection of refugees. He explained that not only was the 
MoU with UNHCR being amended, but that ‘possible accession to those instruments 
[the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol] was a topic of serious consid-
eration in the country and had been the subject of a 2005 workshop’.47 However, he 
continued, ‘any decision thereon called for serious reflection, given national interests, 
the small size of the country and its limited integration capacities’.48 These limitations 
notwithstanding, the Committee’s Concluding Observations stressed the importance 
of Lebanon’s accession:
While welcoming the improved collaboration between the State party and the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
Committee is concerned at the gaps in the legal protection of refugees in the State 
party. It also welcomes the information that the State party undertakes activities 
41 UN doc CRC/C/SR.751-752 (2002).
42 UN doc CRC/C/15/Add.169 (2002) para 53.
43 UN doc CRC/C/129/Add.7 (2005) para 451.
44 ibid para 453. Warring parties signed an Arab-brokered political deal in the Saudi city of Taef, 
known as the Taef Agreement, to end the 1975–90 civil war. For a background to the national 
covenant, see F el-Khazen, ‘The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics 
of the 1943 National Pact’ (Centre for Lebanese Studies 1991).
45 UN doc CRC/C/SR.1142 and 1144 (2006). See also list of issues, UN doc CRC/C/LBN/Q/3 
(2006), pt 4, para 13, in which the Committee flagged the issue of asylum-seeking and refugee 
children to be raised during the dialogue with Lebanon.
46 UN doc CRC/C/SR.1142 (2006) para 69.
47 ibid para 70.
48 ibid.
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to accede to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. The Committee notes with concern that since the State party does not 
extend asylum, many children and their families seeking asylum are subject to 
domestic laws for illegal entry and stay, and thereby are at risk of detention, fines 
and deportation. In this context, the Committee also refers to the concerns and 
recommendations expressed under the right to a nationality.49
It consequently urged Lebanon to ‘accede to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and thus create an environment conducive to refu-
gee protection in the country’ and, further, to ‘continue and strengthen its collabor-
ation with UNHCR’.50
Any move to amend the 2003 MoU with UNHCR or to ratify the 1951 Refugee 
Convention came to an abrupt halt in July 2006, when the armed conflict between 
Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah raised political tensions in Lebanon. UNHCR has 
explained how this change in the political climate put on hold many initiatives that 
had been set in motion to improve refugee protection in Lebanon, including amend-
ments to the national asylum legislation. While UNHCR had managed to garner the 
support of a number of members of parliament who were willing to endorse the pro-
posed amendments, ‘the same MPs, after the war, and because of the ongoing and unre-
solved political tensions, made it clear that any substantial discussion in the parliament 
on immigration/refugee issues would be postponed – possibly for a very long time’.51 
Another factor that also negatively impacted efforts to strengthen refugee protection 
was the unprecedented increase in the number of Iraqi refugees coming to Lebanon in 
2007, which, according to UNHCR, made most of the provisions in the MoU ‘irrele-
vant and unimplementable [sic]’.52 Thus, only months after the July 2006 conflict, 
UNHCR published its 2007 Country Operations Plan, where it explained that:
The objectives of the UNHCR office in Lebanon take into account the fact that 
it is premature for UNHCR to build its strategy on the assumption that Lebanon 
will soon accede to the 1951 Convention / 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees. There are still many obstacles – both political and legal – to Lebanon’s 
accession to the refugee instruments. The latter remains a long term objective but 
it is essential, in the meantime, to build an environment in which persons of con-
cern do feel protected. To actively promote accession before identifying concrete 
remedies to the existing gaps would be inappropriate. The years to come will be 
crucial and should be used to build solid foundations on which an asylum system 
can at a later stage be established.53
49 UN doc CRC/C/LBN/CO/3 (2006) para 71.
50 UN doc CRC/C/LBN/CO/3 (2006) para 72(b) and (d).
51 UNHCR, ‘Country Operations Plan 2008: Lebanon’ (n 30).
52 ibid.
53 UNHCR ‘Country Operations Plan 2007: Lebanon’ (n 30). On UNHCR’s ‘both pragmatic and 
principled’ approach, see also UNHCR ‘Country Operations Plan 2008: Lebanon’ (n 30).
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It is surely for these reasons that UNHCR completely avoided mentioning Lebanon 
acceding to the 1951 Refugee Convention in recommendations submitted in 2010 to 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the occasion of the Universal Periodic 
Review of Lebanon.54 At around the same time, UNHCR’s evaluation of its operations 
for urban Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria also briefly discussed whether or 
not it should adopt a more formal and principled approach, which encouraged these 
countries to sign the 1951 Convention. The authors of the report nevertheless con-
cluded that ‘there is no guarantee that such a strategy would be successful, and a risk 
that it would undermine the goodwill and cooperative relationships that UNHCR has 
been able to establish with the countries of asylum over the past few years’.55
These political tensions were exacerbated following the Syrian conflict and the 
ensuing refugee influx into Lebanon. Lebanese political parties – one political block 
opposing the Syrian regime, and the other openly supporting it – demonstrated con-
flicting attitudes towards the conflict in Syria.56 Thus, despite the promising develop-
ments in 2006, Lebanon’s fourth and fifth reports to the CRC, submitted in November 
2015, made no mention of any plans for acceding to the 1951 Refugee Convention.57 
UNHCR, no longer seeking to modify the MoU or to negotiate a new one, has contin-
ued to adopt a more pragmatic approach to Lebanon’s accession to the Convention. In 
this regard, one senior UNHCR official explained that it matters less whether Lebanon 
has formally acceded to the Convention, and more that the country ‘behaves as if it 
were’ a party to the Convention.58 This approach has nevertheless been questioned 
by UNHCR’s donors, such as the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations, representatives of which, in late 2015, allegedly took it upon themselves to 
question UNHCR Lebanon’s commitment to its mandate and to promoting Lebanon’s 
accession to the Refugee Convention.59
At the same time, it is clear that the Lebanese government has been feeling the inter-
national pressure to accede to the Convention. In October 2014, local papers reported 
how Prime Minister Tamman Salam, Foreign Minister Gibran Bassil, and Minister of 
Social Affairs, Rashid Derbas, ‘thwarted an attempt to push Lebanon towards signing 
the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees’ during the Berlin Conference on 
the Syrian Refugee Situation.60 According to the report, the draft outcome document 
54 UNHCR, ‘Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report – Universal Periodic Review: 
Republic of Lebanon’ (April 2010) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4bcd705e2.html> 
accessed 17 October 2016.
55 J Crisp and others, ‘Surviving in the City: A Review of UNHCR’s Operation for Iraqi Refugees 
in Urban Areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria’ (UNHCR 2009) paras 70–71.
56 D Meier, ‘Lebanon: The Refugee Issue and the Threat of a Sectarian Confrontation’ (2014) 94 
Oriente moderno 382, 383.
57 UN doc CRC/C/LBN/4-5 (2015). These reports were due to be discussed at the CRC 
Committee’s 75th session, May 2017, at the time of writing.
58 UNHCR official (via Skype) 5 October 2016.
59 UNHCR official, Beirut, 27 June 2016.
60 ‘Derbas Says Lebanon and Jordan United at Berlin Conference’ (Naharnet, 24 October 
2014) <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/152503> accessed 24 October 2016.
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of the donor conference included a clause stating that Lebanon should ratify the 1951 
Refugee Convention. The final document, however, included no such clause, but ra-
ther reaffirmed Lebanon’s position on the ‘voluntary application’ of the Convention, an 
approach that will be considered later.61
Another example of this international pressure is found in the increasing engage-
ment of the CEDAW and CERD Committees. While these Committees had previously 
disregarded the question of a Lebanese accession to the 1951 Refugee Convention,62 
in 2008, the CEDAW Committee urged Lebanon not only to ‘adopt laws and regu-
lations relating to the status of asylum-seekers and refugees in Lebanon, in line with 
international standards’, but also to ‘consider accession to international instruments to 
address the situation of refugees and stateless persons, including the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol’.63 In 2015, it reiterated this 
call,64 while the CERD Committee, in its 2016 Concluding Observations, called upon 
Lebanon to ‘establish a clear and comprehensive legal framework on asylum respecting 
the principle of non-refoulement and enabling asylum-seekers and refugees to exercise 
their fundamental rights without discrimination’, and encouraged it to ‘consider rati-
fying those international human rights instruments that it has not yet ratified, in par-
ticular treaties with provisions that have direct relevance to communities that may be 
subjected to racial discrimination’.65
It is thus evident that despite Lebanon’s strong opposition to ratifying the 
Convention, international efforts to persuade it to do so have continued and, in fact, 
appear to have strengthened. This raises the questions why Lebanon continues to reject 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, and how it seeks to legitimize this. The next section will 
seek to answer these questions.
4 .  L E B A N O N ’ S  N O N - C O M M I T M E N T  TO  T H E  
1 9 5 1  R E F U G E E  C O N V E N T I O N
4.1 Uncertainty about Convention obligations
4.1.1 The permanent settlement of refugees 
It is arguable that Lebanon has remained a non-party to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention because of a real, or perhaps politically expedient, uncertainty about 
what the Convention obliges Contracting States to do. An example is the common 
argument that the Convention cannot be ratified because it would require the per-
manent settlement or local integration of refugees, including Palestinians. There is a 
61 Berlin Conference on the Syrian Refugee Situation: Supporting Stability in the Region: Declaration 
<http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/728630fd951646bcae64d9e5a8277307/declaration-
of-the-berlin-conference-on-the-syrian-refugee-situation> accessed 25 October 2016.
62 See eg UN doc CERD/C/304/Add.49 (1998); UN doc CERD/C/64/CO/3 (2004).
63 UN doc CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/3 (2008) para 41.
64 UN doc CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/4-5 (2015) paras 11–12.
65 UN doc CERD/C/LBN/CO/18-22 (2016) paras 28 and 46.
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fear that refugees recognized under international refugee law would pose a threat to 
social and sectarian cohesion in the country. Lebanon, home to 18 different sects, 
has long sought to preserve its delicate demographic balance, and numbers have 
become important in power struggles. The last census was held in 1932 and, because 
political representation was based on its findings, it played a fundamental role in 
Lebanon’s State-building process.66 In such a context, the presence of refugees raises 
concerns about substantial demographic changes in the country, which would have 
major political implications.67 Lebanon’s experience with the predominantly Sunni 
Palestinians, who are often blamed for playing a substantial role in the build-up 
towards the Lebanese civil war (1975–90), is a key reason for the highly politicized 
refugee issue.
There is unanimous political agreement on the rejection of naturalization of 
refugees in Lebanon.68 The government has long wished to reduce the numbers of 
Palestinians in its territory, and this is not only reflected in the long-term marginal-
ization of Palestine refugees,69 but also has arguably had an impact on the Lebanese 
Constitution (as amended in 1990). The preamble of this Constitution refers to the 
concept of tawteen, stating that there shall be no tawteen in Lebanon. It is not obvious 
what is meant by this term, and translations of the Constitution do little to clarify this. 
The official French version translates tawteen into ‘l’implantation’, meaning ‘implant-
ation’ in English, but no explicit mention is made of Palestinians, refugees, or foreign-
ers.70 It is thus unclear who or what is forbidden from being ‘implanted’. The confusion 
is even greater in the English language versions of the Constitution, where (at least) 
three different versions translate tawteen in very different ways. An official version 
found at the Office of the Presidency states that:
Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese shall have the right 
to live in any part thereof and to enjoy the rule of law wherever he resides. There 
66 See generally R Maktabi, ‘The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?’ 
(1999) 26 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 219.
67 J Suleiman, ‘Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’ (University 
of Sussex Development Research Centre of Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty 2006)  6. 
See also M Dumper, ‘Palestinian Refugees’ in G Loescher and others (eds), Protracted Refugee 
Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications (UN University Press 2008).
68 An important exception was when the government of former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, 
granted citizenship to thousands of Syrians and Palestinians in 1994. It is also noteworthy that 
Armenian refugees were naturalized in the pre-independence period. See GG Hourani and E 
Sensenig-Dabbous, ‘Naturalized Citizens: Political Participation, Voting Behavior, and Impact on 
Elections in Lebanon (1996–2007)’ (2012) 13 Journal of International Migration & Integration 
187; International Crisis Group, ‘Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps’ 
(2009) 15.
69 Erakat (n 5) 605.
70 Constitution du Liban, preamble <http://www.presidency.gov.lb/French/LebaneseSystem/
Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf> accessed 25 October 2016.
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shall be no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belonging, and  
no fragmentation, partition, or settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon.71
However, in contrast, another official version found at the Ministry of Information 
reads:
Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese shall have the right 
to live in any part of it and to enjoy the sovereignty of law wherever he resides. 
There shall be no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belong-
ing, and no fragmentation, partition, or colonization.72
This latter translation of tawteen appears to make little sense, particularly as the proper 
term for colonization in Arabic is istitan, not tawteen. A third, unofficial, version, found 
at the University of Oxford’s Constitute Project, is:
The territory of Lebanon is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese has the right to 
reside on any part thereof, and enjoy it under the sovereignty of the law. No segre-
gation of the people on any belonging whatsoever. No segregation, no partition, 
and no inhabitation.73
Again, it is unclear what is forbidden by the Constitution. The different translations of 
the same passage suggest that the concept of tawteen is far from being a term of art. Yet, 
it is key to understanding Lebanon’s rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
In the literature, some have argued that tawteen is in fact a type of ‘Lebanese pol-
itical jargon’,74 which, because of its multiple interpretations, ‘lends itself easily to pol-
itical and polemic usage’.75 This suggests that the ideological and political background 
of each translator plays a decisive role in the interpretation of tawteen in the Lebanese 
Constitution. The term itself, understood by Lebanon scholar Daniel Meier to mean 
‘settlement’ or ‘implantation’, is derived from the word for homeland (watan). While the 
verb wattana means more precisely to settle down, there appear to be shades of mean-
ing; the similar term tawattana, coming from the same root, also means to settle down, 
but in an active sense. In comparison, tawteen ‘is a situation that people endure as if they 
were obliged to settle down’.76 The term is unquestionably primarily employed in rela-
tion to Lebanon’s Palestine refugees, and some have even argued that the Constitution 
71 Lebanese Constitution, preamble <http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/LebaneseSystem/
Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf> accessed 25 October 2016 (emphasis added).
72 Lebanese Constitution, preamble <http://www.ministryinfo.gov.lb/en/sub/Lebanon/Lebanese 
Constitution.aspx> accessed 25 October 2016 (emphasis added).
73 Lebanese Constitution, preamble <http://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004.
pdf?lang=en> accessed 25 October 2016 (emphasis added).
74 F el Khazen, ‘Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: A Recipe for Conflict’ (1997) 10 
Journal of Refugee Studies 275, 275.
75 D Meier, ‘“Al-tawteen”: The Implantation Problem as an Idiom of the Palestinian Presence in 
Post-Civil War Lebanon (1989–2005)’ (2010) 32 Arab Studies Quarterly 145, 147.
76 ibid 147.
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therefore institutionalizes the country’s strong fear of the permanent settlement of 
Palestinians.77 During the Lebanese civil war, tawteen was used in a mobilizing manner 
to pinpoint ‘the enemy’s intention and that which is threatened – the homeland and the 
nation’.78 Importantly, it was used to denounce ‘a conspiracy’, which aimed at ‘transform-
ing Lebanese territory into a substitute homeland (watan badil) for foreigners (i.e. the 
Palestinians)’.79 Seen from this perspective, the English translations of tawteen as settle-
ment, inhabitation, and colonization may appear to be two sides of the same coin. It is 
also noteworthy that Lebanese political actors have more recently also tied the concept 
of tawteen explicitly to the country’s Syrian refugees, showing how Lebanon’s history 
with Palestine refugees has now been directly linked to its response to the Syrian influx.
This institutionalized rejection of the Palestine (and now increasingly Syrian) refugee 
presence appears to have led to the belief that ratifying the Refugee Convention would 
give permanency to the country’s refugees in general, and to its Palestinian population in 
particular. Political leaders frequently brand the Convention as a step towards the natural-
ization of the Palestinians,80 and Lebanon’s statements to international human rights bod-
ies confirm this belief. As mentioned previously, in 2006, Lebanon explained its ‘delay’ in 
acceding to the Refugee Convention by referring to the complexity of providing national-
ity to Palestine refugees, which, it argued, is unanimously rejected by all political actors.81
What statements such as these suggest is that there is a widespread, real, or politic-
ally expedient, misperception of the obligations brought by ratification. First, it is evi-
dent that Palestine refugees under the mandate of UNRWA are excluded from the 1951 
Convention, owing to Lebanon’s and other Middle Eastern States’ lobbying during the 
drafting process. Secondly, Lebanon would certainly not be obligated to permanently 
settle refugees if it ratified the 1951 Convention. Although article 34 of the Convention 
inter alia provides that ‘the contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate the assimi-
lation and naturalization of refugees’, there is nothing in the Convention that obliges 
States to unreservedly and permanently host refugees. This provision is merely a recom-
mendation – the drafters of the 1951 Convention considered the question of naturaliza-
tion as a matter of ‘such delicate nature that in every case the final decision must rest with 
the organs of the state concerned’.82 The adopted text, with the inclusion of ‘as far as pos-
sible’, mirrors the concerns States had during the drafting process. In any case, Lebanon 
would be free to decide upon an eventual reservation to article 34.83 This suggests that 
77 An important exception to the taboo of Palestinian tawteen has been the many Christian 
Palestinians who have been naturalized via presidential decree. See Hourani and Sensenig-
Dabbous (n 68); Suleiman (n 67) 18.
78 Meier, Al-tawteen (n 75) 147.
79 ibid.
80 S Sikimic, ‘Refugees Aplenty but No Convention’ Daily Star (Lebanon, 28 May 2011) <http://
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2011/May-28/139723-refugees-aplenty-but-no-
convention.ashx> accessed 25 October 2016.
81 UN doc CRC/C/129/Add.7 (2006) para 453; see also para 445.
82 A Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the 1951 Refugee Convention, Articles 2–11 and 13–37 (1963, 
republished by UNHCR 1997) 145.
83 JC Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2011) 95.
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opposition to accession may not only be due to the failure by Lebanese policymakers to 
fully understand the obligations laid down in the Convention. Opposing accession may 
also serve the political purpose of appearing to ‘defend’ Lebanon from refugee natural-
ization, and thus to be seen to preserve Lebanon’s sectarian balance.
4.1.2 No country of asylum 
A related example of the real or politically strategic misconception of the obligations 
contained in the 1951 Convention is the Lebanese conviction that by not ratifying the 
Convention it avoids becoming a country of asylum. The strong opposition to being 
a country of asylum is due to the belief that it would entail the permanent settlement 
of refugees. In other words, Lebanon often equates the notions of ‘asylum’ with ‘per-
manent settlement’, or, in the language of international refugee law, with local integra-
tion. This idea appears to have its roots in the concept of tawteen, but was allegedly not 
properly formalized as a government policy before it was included in the 2003 MoU 
between UNHCR and Lebanon’s General Security Office.84 The agreement not only 
affirms that ‘Lebanon does not consider itself an asylum country’, but also specifies that 
an ‘asylum seeker’ means a ‘person seeking asylum in a country other than Lebanon’.85 
It is, therefore, arguable that this document not only legitimizes the notion of Lebanon 
not being a country of asylum, but also that it helped to introduce a principle that has 
since found its way into numerous official documents, and even judicial decisions.86 As 
already mentioned, the LCRP proclaims that ‘Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, 
nor a final destination for refugees, let alone a country of resettlement’.
This may appear particularly paradoxical when examining the Lebanese Constitution. 
While forbidding tawteen, it also states that Lebanon shall ‘without exception’ abide 
by key international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).87 As will be discussed below, Lebanon played a key role in 
the development of the UDHR, which in article 14(1) provides that ‘Everyone has the 
right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries’. This article does 
not contain a guarantee of permanent residence in the receiving State.88 Rather, inter-
national law considers asylum to be ‘the protection that a State grants on its territory or 
in some other place under the control of certain of its organs to a person who comes to 
seek it’.89
84 Lawyer, Beirut, 11 March 2016.
85 UNHCR, ‘The Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of the General 
Security (Republic of Lebanon) and the regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Concerning the processing of cases of asylum-seekers applying for refugee status with 
the UNHCR Office’ (9 September 2003).
86 Lawyer, Beirut, 11 March 2016.
87 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA res 217 A(III) 
(UDHR).
88 Einarsen (n 20).
89 Institute of International Law (5th Commission), ‘Asylum in Public International Law’, 
Resolutions Adopted at its Bath Session, September 1950, art 1. See also MT Gil-Bazo, ‘Asylum 
as a General Principle of International Law’ (2015) 27 International Journal of Refugee Law 3.
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Although the constitutional principle of international obligations taking precedence 
over national law has seldom been practised in Lebanese courts,90 there are important 
exceptions. In a series of judgments concerning the irregular entry of Syrian refugees 
into Lebanon, issued from 2012 onwards, Tripoli-based Judge Nazek Khatib engaged 
with UDHR article 14. With a direct and well-argued reference to the right to seek 
asylum, Judge Khatib removed the irregular entry charges for a number of Syrian refu-
gees.91 While some judges have followed suit, many remain sceptical, as Judge Khatib’s 
judgments are in stark contrast to the standard operating procedure, which charges 
those who enter Lebanon irregularly with illegal entry, often resulting in deportation 
orders. It is illustrative of the politicized nature of the right to seek asylum in Lebanon 
that political groups have accused Judge Khatib of ‘being with the Syrian opposition 
and the Revolution’.92
Asylum is, in the Lebanese context, often understood as ‘a final destination for refu-
gees to be locally integrated or resettled’.93 At the heart of these discussions lies the 
distinction between being either a transit or a destination country. Not only does the 
2003 MoU reaffirm the ‘transit country concept’ by imposing strict time limits on refu-
gees’ residence, but Lebanon’s report to CEDAW in 2014 also suggests that it sees a 
link between ratifying the Refugee Convention and becoming a ‘destination country’. 
It states that it ‘has not signed the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) 
and Lebanon is still considered as a transit country not a destination country’.94 This 
view is reinforced in its report to the CRC Committee, submitted in November 2015, 
where Lebanon explains how:
The characterization ‘refugee’ does not apply to displaced Syrians who came to 
Lebanon as the Lebanese State does not grant them such characterization and 
considers their presence temporary and for purely humanitarian grounds, given 
that Lebanon has not signed the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol.95
More recent examples, from August 2016, are the discussions in the CERD Committee 
of Lebanon’s increasingly restrictive regulations for Syrian refugees. The Lebanese rep-
resentative explained that Syrians could enter freely if they sought temporary residence 
under the new regulations, but not if they sought ‘permanent’ residence as ‘refugees’ or 
‘immigrants’.96
The link being made between refugees and permanent residence is not coinci-
dental. In fact, Lebanese actors go to great lengths to avoid the ‘refugee’ label, which 
90 ALEF – Act for Human Rights, ‘Two Years On: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’ (September 2013).
91 G Frangieh, ‘Judicial Ruling to Overturn “Preconceived Notions” in the Case of a Syrian Refugee: 
Practicing the Right to Asylum is Not a Crime’ (The Legal Agenda, July 2012).
92 Judge, Beirut, 29 February 2016.
93 Government official, Beirut, 10 June 2016.
94 UN doc CEDAW/C/LBN/4-5 (2014) para 266.
95 See UN doc CRC/C/LBN/4-5 (2015) fn 2.
96 UN doc CERD/C/SR.2463 (2016).
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is predominantly associated with Palestinians. There also appears to be the idea that 
the mere use of the term ‘refugee’ would trigger the application of the international 
refugee law regime.97 Use of the ‘refugee’ label would, it is feared, become a back-door 
to ratifying the Refugee Convention. Similar fears have been described by Stevens in 
the Jordanian context.98 As one government official explained:
For us, they’re not refugees. Officially speaking … we realize whether under the 
Convention, or international law, or whatever, they’re acknowledged refugees, 
they’re not [only] displaced. But because of the specificity of Lebanon in par-
ticular they are not considered as refugees.99
Lebanese authorities have accordingly resorted to a myriad of different labels to refer to 
Syrians seeking protection in Lebanon.
4.1.3 Terminological confusion on durable solutions 
Although international refugee law identifies three different durable solutions to the 
problem of refugees – local integration, voluntary repatriation, and resettlement – there 
appears to be a lack of clarity in Lebanon as to what these solutions entail. Some of this 
confusion is rooted in a common misunderstanding that both the notions of resettle-
ment and voluntary return require local integration in Lebanon, which, as explained 
above, is unanimously ruled out. For example, in December 2015, when the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 2254, which referred to the ‘voluntary return’ of 
Syrian refugees, Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, Gibran Bassil, voiced strong opposition to 
the Resolution, and wrote to the UN Secretary-General to argue that voluntary return 
could indicate attempts to ‘settle Syrians’ in Lebanon.100 Many Lebanese political fig-
ures appear uncomfortable with the voluntary aspect of voluntary return, preferring to 
speak of ‘safe return’, a notion that human rights groups fear aims to clear a path for the 
non-voluntary return of refugees to ostensibly ‘safe’ areas in their countries of origin.101
Additionally, in the Lebanese discourse, the concepts of local integration and 
resettlement have often been used interchangeably. While ‘resettlement’ is understood 
in international refugee law as ‘involving the selection and transfer of refugees from a 
State in which they have sought protection to a third state which has agreed to admit 
97 F Dionigi, ‘The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience’ (2015) 
LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 15.
98 Stevens (n 3).
99 Government official, Beirut, 10 June 2016.
100 ‘Lebanon to Revise Population Movement, Impacts’ Daily Star (Lebanon, 25 December 
2015)  <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Dec-25/328920-lebanon-
to-revise-population-movement-impacts.ashx> accessed 25 October 2016; ‘UN Chief Allays 
Lebanon’s Fears over Refugee Settlement’ Daily Star (Lebanon, 5 March 2016) <http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Mar-05/340629-un-chief-allays-lebanons-fears-
over-refugee-settlement.ashx> accessed 25 October 2016.
101 ‘Bassil: To Adhere to Lebanese Formula’ (National News Agency, 15 February 2016) <http://
nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/56822/nna-leb.gov.lb/nna-leb.gov.lb> accessed 26 May 2017.
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them – as refugees – with permanent residence status’,102 in Lebanon, this term is often 
applied to situations of local integration or naturalization (tawteen) in both third coun-
tries and in Lebanon. An example of this conflation is found in the statements made 
by Lebanon to the CERD Committee in 2015, where one representative stated that 
‘Lebanon was not seeking to definitively resettle refugees [in Lebanon], as it hoped that 
they would be able to safely return home one day’.103 Again, note the reference to the 
preferred notion of ‘safe return’.
4.2 Third-party surrogacy
Another key reason why Lebanon is reluctant to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention 
lies in the issue of third-party responsibility over Lebanon’s refugees. Kagan has long 
written about the responsibility-shift from the sovereign State to the UN which is so 
prevalent in the Middle East for both Palestine and non-Palestine refugees.104 In this 
context, when the UN becomes a ‘surrogate State’, many governments in the region are 
more likely to tolerate the presence of refugees on their territory if responsibility for 
them is assigned to a third party. In general, Palestine refugees fall under the mandate 
of UNRWA, while UNHCR has long done the ‘handling’ of all non-Palestine refugees. 
As one government official explained: ‘UNHCR has relieved the Lebanese government 
from the burden of all non-Palestinian refugees for more than 50  years’.105 It was, in 
the official’s view, the ‘normal order of things’ that UNHCR was in charge of refugee 
situations, ‘considering that Lebanon is not a country of asylum and that it has not 
signed the Refugee Convention’.106 He/she also argued that ‘when the host state disas-
sociates itself from refugees, UNHCR’s mandate requires that it provides refugees with 
the necessary protection’. The obvious advantages for Lebanon of such surrogacy have 
made the State less inclined to become a party to the 1951 Convention and take on 
many tasks itself. The general belief in Lebanon is that should it ratify the Convention, 
it would be required to bear more of the burden, practically and economically, but also 
politically.
Under the UN ‘surrogate State’ approach, UNHCR carries the heaviest burden of 
addressing refugees’ positive liberties by carrying out status determination, registra-
tion, healthcare, education, nutrition, and livelihood assistance. Host States, on the 
other hand, are able to ‘protect’ refugees ‘simply by restraining the impact of restrictive 
immigration policies through a policy of benign neglect’.107 Indeed, Lebanon’s state-
ments to the international human rights bodies are quite revealing in regards to how it 
perceives the role of the UN, at least when it comes to Palestine refugees. It has inter alia 
claimed that the enforcement of Palestinian rights is UNRWA’s responsibility,108 and, 
102 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook (2011) <http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf> accessed 
25 October 2016.
103 UN doc CERD/C/SR.2463 (2016) para 45; see also para 9.
104 Kagan (n 3) 308.
105 Government official, Beirut, 10 June 2016 (emphasis added).
106 ibid.
107 Kagan (n 3) 312.
108 Statement by Mr Nehme (Lebanon), UN doc CRC/C/SR.751 (2002) para 27.
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more specifically, that ‘the question of Palestinian refugees was the responsibility of the 
international community and not of Lebanon’.109
Lebanon has similarly long been reliant on UNHCR to protect and assist, and to 
seek durable solutions for all non-Palestine refugees. In 1963, Lebanon and UNHCR 
entered into a ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’, which remained in place until the late 1990s, 
when it finally broke down.110 It was replaced in 2003 with the MoU between UNHCR 
and Lebanon’s General Security Office, which generally outlined the conditions for 
cooperation between the parties. Middle Eastern governments often consider such 
MoUs as more attractive than ratifying the Convention, but they may also, as Zaiotti 
has argued, ‘represent an intermediate stage towards access to the international refu-
gee regime’.111 It may be for this reason that when the 2003 MoU broke down, only a 
few years after its negotiation, it was challenging for UNHCR to formally regulate its 
cooperation with the government. Recent negotiations regarding a new MoU failed 
to bear fruit, and one government official explained that the Lebanese government’s 
‘concerns over an agreement is due to the fear of transforming Lebanon into a country 
of asylum as well as attracting more refugees from around the region’.112
A frequent argument made by several Middle Eastern governments is that they can-
not bear the economic cost of refugee recognition, which incurs heavy financial bur-
dens. Indeed, Lebanon has similarly argued before several UN human rights bodies 
that its efforts to implement the human rights provisions of, for example, the CRC, 
have been hampered by a lack of financial resources.113 During an interview, a govern-
ment official claimed that the Refugee Convention would be detrimental to the govern-
ment’s work because ‘with the number of Syrians here we would need to recruit half 
the population to do case work’.114 This suggests a lack of awareness or ignorance of the 
availability of group-based, or prima facie, refugee status.
While Lebanon has long had one of the highest levels of government debt in the 
world,115 estimates about the effect of the Syrian influx on Lebanon’s economy are 
heavily politicized and contested. Government-affiliated studies have found the Syrian 
influx to have had a negative impact of on Lebanon’s economy,116 while, in contrast, 
international organizations and independent researchers have found evidence that sug-
gests that the Lebanese economy is sufficiently resilient to absorb new workers without 
109 UN doc CERD/C/SR.1629 (2004) para 19.
110 Kagan (n 3) 328.
111 Zaiotti (n 2) 336.
112 Government official, Beirut, 10 June 2016.
113 See eg statement by Mr Mekhael (Lebanon), UN doc CRC/C/SR.1142 (2006) para 3. See also 
statement by Mr Khalil (Lebanon), UN doc CRC/C/SR.291 (1996) para 41: ‘With regard to 
the assistance given to non-Lebanese children, the budget available in his country was not suffi-
cient even for Lebanese children’.
114 Government official, Beirut, 18 June 2016.
115 World Economic Forum, Competitiveness rankings: Government debt (2016) <http://reports.
weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index/competitiveness-rankings/#series=GOVDEBTGDP> 
accessed 31 October 2016.
116 World Bank, ‘Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict’ (2013).
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adverse effects for host-country residents.117 However, while the international commu-
nity’s humanitarian response has helped to mitigate the effects of the Syrian conflict, 
studies have shown that it has not completely offset them.118 In any case, keeping the 
country’s refugees under the purview of the UN enables them to remain highly vis-
ible, and maintains the pressure on the international community to continue to support 
their care and maintenance. Equally important, in the Middle East, is that the involve-
ment of a third party often portrays the refugee presence as temporary – although pro-
tracted refugee situations in other parts of the world have demonstrated that such an 
argument lacks basis.119
Politically, Lebanon has long considered UNHCR to be a useful tool in dealing 
with refugee flows. Lebanon is characterized by different communal groups seeking 
to dominate others politically, as well as by the need for consensus on all decisions 
and a de facto veto power that disrupts the political process.120 In such circumstances, 
and when institutions are weak, it is particularly attractive to leave the refugee issue 
to a third party. Indeed, in the early stages of the Syrian influx to Lebanon, Lebanese 
political actors struggled to find a common approach to handling the situation, lead-
ing the Minister of Social Affairs to explain that the best way to deal with the Syrian 
influx was under the auspices of the UN: ‘Working under the UN would be discrete and 
more effective in this case’.121 This, of course, has also had its downsides. As one govern-
ment official, only half-jokingly, told me, in the course of the Syrian refugee response, 
‘UNHCR became stronger, became more important than the President of the Republic 
… [it became a] major decision-maker in the country’.122 It is therefore no surprise that 
not all domestic actors are content with shifting the responsibility for important issues 
to a third party; Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, renowned for his tense relationship with 
UNHCR, has on several occasions threatened to keep the agency on a short leash. In 
2014, he commented to local media: ‘From now on, Lebanon will be setting making 
refugee policies while the others, including UNHCR, will work according to them and 
not the other way around’.123
There are further political reasons for Lebanon’s reluctance to commit to the inter-
national refugee regime. The following section examines the good-neighbourliness 
argument.
117 International Rescue Committee, ‘Emergency Economies: The Impact of Cash Assistance in 
Lebanon’ (2014).
118 UNHCR and UNDP, ‘Impact of Humanitarian Aid on the Lebanese Economy’ (2015).
119 Notable examples are Kenya’s camps for Somali and Sudanese refugees.
120 Salamey (n 7).
121 A Amrieh, ‘Syrian Refugees Begin to Trickle Back across the Border’ Daily Star (Lebanon, 31 
May 2011)  <www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2011/May-31/139933-syrian-refu 
gees-begin-to-trickle-back-across-the-border.ashx#> accessed 25 October 2016.
122 Government official, Beirut, 6 June 2016.
123 H Lakkis, ‘Bassil: Lebanon, Not UN, Sets Refugee Policies’ Daily Star (Lebanon, 11 November 
2014) <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-11/277234-bassil-
lebanon-not-un-sets-refugee-policies.ashx> accessed 25 October 2016.
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4.3 Good-neighbourliness
The 1992 Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the 
Arab World echoes the 1951 Refugee Convention in stating that ‘the granting of asylum 
should not … be regarded as an unfriendly act vis-à-vis any other State’.124 However, 
this principle – the Declaration being endorsed only by Egypt – has had to give way to 
the ‘good-neighbourliness’ argument, which takes as central the general principle that 
States should not interfere in the ‘sensitive issues’ of neighbouring countries. Not want-
ing to accuse fellow Arab States of persecution, it is a political problem for many Middle 
Eastern States that refugees in this region typically come from neighbours.125 One way 
of ameliorating these political sensitivities is thus to avoid responsibility for the refu-
gees by handing over the responsibility to third parties, and by avoiding certain obli-
gations towards refugees by remaining non-parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Ratifying the Convention would, it is often thought, entail a duty to recognize certain 
forced migrants as refugees.
While Lebanon’s history with Palestine refugees demonstrates that refugees may 
indeed represent a geopolitical and strategic concern, these concerns became even 
more acute when Syrian nationals began seeking protection in Lebanon in the spring 
of 2011. Lebanese political groups are sharply split over the conflict in Syria.126 At the 
same time, the country has long had special relations with Syria, evident not least in 
treaties such as the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between 
the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic.127 These special relations are also 
highlighted in the Taef Agreement that ended Lebanon’s civil war in 1990. Here, Syrian 
forces were given a specific role in assisting the Lebanese government’s assertion of 
authority over its territory, justified by the idea that Syria and Lebanon have ‘the roots 
of blood relationships, history and joint fraternal interests’.128
In June 2012, Lebanon’s caretaker government established a policy of neutrality 
towards the events in Syria under the label of the ‘disassociation policy’.129 The policy 
aimed to preserve the delicate political balance between the various sectarian forces 
that, as political factions, were unable to come to agreement. Lebanese politicians were 
generally divided between pro-Syrian regime supporters and pro-opposition support-
ers, and there was no possibility of reaching a consensus even on how to respond to the 
refugee influx. This explains why Judge Khatib’s ruling on the UDHR article 14 right to 
seek asylum was perceived by some as evidence of support for the Syrian opposition. 
124 Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World (19 
November 1992)  <http://www.refworld.org/docid/452675944.html> accessed 31 October 
2016.
125 Kagan (n 3) 324.
126 Meier ‘Lebanon’ (n 56) 383.
127 22 May 1991. See UN Treaty Series <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/
files/LB-SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf> accessed 25 October 
2016.
128 Taef Agreement (11 October 1989)  8 <http://peacemaker.un.org/lebanon-taifaccords89> 
accessed 25 October 2016.
129 Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN, Baabda Declaration Issued by the National Dialogue 
Committee on 11 June 2012, annexed to UN doc A/66/849–S/2012/477 (2012).
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However, the Syrian regime still had a strong influence on segments of the Lebanese 
political field despite officially withdrawing from Lebanese territory in 2005.
The ‘good-neighbourliness’ argument nevertheless holds that Lebanon should not 
employ the term ‘refugee’ because by doing so the State would find itself in positions 
that could violate the good neighbour principle. Indeed, one strand of the Lebanese 
government’s disassociation policy was the enforcement of the term ‘displaced persons’ 
(‘nazihoun’) rather than ‘refugees’ (‘lajioun’). In this way, as a senior government adviser 
explained, ‘the Lebanese government not only avoided labelling those who have fled to 
Lebanon as people escaping from persecution, it avoided acknowledging that there is a 
war in Syria’.130 The difficulties of labelling Syrians seeking protection nevertheless con-
tinued long after the policy was adopted. This is evident in official government and UN 
documents, such as the LCRP, which introduces various terms – including the curious 
notion of ‘de facto refugees’131 – to refer to persons who fled from Syria after March 
2011:
1. ‘persons displaced from Syria’ (which can, depending on context, include 
Palestine refugees from Syria and Lebanese Returnees as well as registered and 
unregistered Syrian nationals), 2.  ‘persons registered as refugees by UNHCR’, 
and 3. ‘de facto refugees’. (both 2. and 3. referring exclusively to Syrian nationals 
who are registered with UNHCR or seeking registration.132
The LCRP furthermore refers to the question of Lebanon’s ‘voluntary’ application of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, which leads to the next and final argument – that many 
in Lebanon consider the Convention redundant.
4.4 The ‘redundancy’ of the 1951 Refugee Convention
4.4.1 Lebanon’s ‘voluntary’ application of Convention provisions 
A more recent argument legitimizing Lebanon’s non-accession to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention claims that accession to the Convention is redundant for a number of 
reasons. First, it is argued, Lebanon need not accede to the Convention as it already 
applies many of its provisions voluntarily. This sentiment was already discernable in 
2006, when Lebanon sought to become a member of the UN Human Rights Council, 
and outlined its human rights record in a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General. 
On the Refugee Convention, it wrote: ‘Lebanon is not a party to this Convention, but 
the Lebanese authorities pursue a strategy of protecting refugees and persons who have 
130 Government official, Beirut, 10 June 2016.
131 The term ‘de facto refugees’ has in comparison been used by scholars when forced migrants 
in Europe or North America have fallen outside the 1951 Refugee Convention’s definition of 
‘refugee’ but nevertheless cannot return home. They have therefore often been allowed to re-
main in countries of asylum under various temporary statuses. See WT Worster, ‘The Evolving 
Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary International Law’ (2012) 30 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 93, 116.
132 UNHCR and Government of Lebanon ‘LCRP’ (n 11).
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entered Lebanon illegally’.133 A decade later, in August 2016, a Lebanese representative 
told the CERD Committee that: ‘Lebanon had never closed its borders to persons at 
risk of persecution although it was not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees’.134 The same argument was made to the CEDAW Committee in 
2015, when the Lebanese representative stated that:
Lebanon, although it did not sign the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, complies with the principle of non-refoule-
ment of refugees. The General Directorate of General Security does not deport 
persons whom it believes will be subjected to danger, violence or threat in their 
countries.135
It is arguable that Lebanon is bound by many key refugee protection principles by 
means of customary international law, or by other human rights treaties to which it is 
in fact a party. In other words, it need not apply the 1951 Refugee Convention volun-
tarily to be bound, for instance, by the principle of non-refoulement. In addition to the 
1951 Convention, the principle of non-refoulement is expressed in article 3 of the 1984 
UN Convention against Torture – a treaty ratified by Lebanon.136 At the same time, 
some scholars have argued that non-refoulement is a long-standing rule of customary 
international law, which would then bind Lebanon irrespective of other treaty obliga-
tions.137 However, non-ratification due to other human rights commitments appears to 
be a separate argument, as shown below. The claim of voluntarily applying the Refugee 
Convention’s provisions appears to be a specific political and rhetorical point that has 
even been included in official Lebanese documents, as well as in those of the UN.
The LCRP, for example, sets out the premise of Lebanon’s refugee response with 
regard to the international refugee regime. It notably includes a preambular text-box 
explicitly stating that:
Lebanon is not a State Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and has not signed its 1967 Protocol. Lebanon implements some pro-
visions of the Convention on a voluntary basis and considers that granting the 
refugee status to individuals lies within its margin of discretion.138
Interestingly, this approach has also been adopted in international donor documents. 
For instance, the outcome document of the Berlin Conference on the Syrian Refugee 
133 Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN, ‘Lebanon’s Pledges and Commitments: Lebanon’s 
Candidature to the Human Rights Council’ (2006) <http://www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/ 
lebanon.pdf> accessed 25 October 2016.
134 UN doc CERD/C/SR.2463 (2016) (emphasis added).
135 UN doc CEDAW/C/LBN/Q/4-5/Add.1 (2015) 6 (emphasis added).
136 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85.
137 GS Goodwin-Gill and J McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2007) ch 5.
138 UNHCR and Government of Lebanon ‘LCRP’ (n 11).
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Situation in 2014 includes a section stating that: ‘some host countries are not State 
Parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and … they 
are implementing some of their provisions on a voluntary basis’.139
Government officials argued during interviews that the Lebanese response to the 
Syrian influx in terms of what they call ‘de facto rights’ had not been affected by the fact 
that Lebanon is a non-party to the Convention. As one explained, the measures taken 
by the government, ‘although late and hesitant, were similar to the behaviour of a sig-
natory country of the Convention’.140 Another official not only stressed that Lebanon 
voluntarily applied most of the Convention’s provisions, but also that this included 
voluntarily applying the Convention’s derogation clause in article 9, which presup-
poses that there may be circumstances warranting and justifying that Contracting 
States withhold all or certain components of refugee status.141 This suggests that cer-
tain actors possess detailed knowledge of the contents and scope of the Convention, 
which might be explained by UNHCR’s consistent efforts to increase knowledge of 
the basics of international refugee law. However, interviews with UN staff suggest that 
Lebanon’s insistence on its voluntary application of the Convention has become an 
issue of apprehension.142 While UNHCR currently pragmatically accepts States not 
ratifying the Refugee Convention as long as they uphold the refugee protection prin-
ciples embedded therein, some argue that the Lebanese claim of voluntary application 
of the Convention shifts the focus from being a question of obligation to being an issue 
of generosity and hospitality. This, it is argued, detracts from the fact that Lebanon has 
international law commitments stemming from a number of sources that are key in 
refugee protection. It is to these obligations that the next section turns.
4.4.2 Lebanon: ‘a human rights pioneer’ 
By virtue of its membership of the UN and its ratification of a number of core human 
rights instruments, Lebanon has a number of human rights obligations towards refu-
gees on its territory. For this reason, some argue, any ratification of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention is superfluous. Lebanese politicians often stress the measures Lebanon is 
taking to abide by ‘international standards’,143 and, as one government official correctly 
pointed out, ‘in order to provide basic rights to refugees, a country does not have to 
be a party to the Convention’.144 Lebanon’s history of participating in drafting some of 
the earliest international human rights instruments has, furthermore, brought about 
a notion of Lebanon being the cradle of human rights, and it is not uncommon to 
hear the argument that ‘in the Middle East we are pioneers’.145 A senior UN official 
commented:
139 Berlin Conference (n 61).
140 Government official, Beirut, 10 June 2016.
141 Government official, Beirut, 18 June 2016.
142 UNHCR official (via Skype) 5 October 2016; UNHCR official, Beirut, 27 June 2016.
143 Lakkis (n 123).
144 Government official, Beirut, 10 June 2016.
145 Government Official, Beirut, 18 April 2016. This same argument was also made to UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan. See Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN (n 133).
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One day I was so surprised by one of the intelligence officers who was completely 
rejecting the 1951 Convention, but then went on and on about how Lebanon 
was part of drafting the UN Charter, or I don’t know what, the ICCPR, or what-
ever. So I was thinking, ‘Okay, you are telling me that you are completely ignoring 
the ’51 Convention but everything else is thanks to Lebanon that we have all of 
these treaties …’
And at the end of the conversation I was like, ‘Do you realize that the 1951 
Convention, except the definition of refugees, it’s all the rights in all the other 
instruments that you claim Lebanon wrote, basically, almost wrote from scratch’. 
So I think that they have a sense of being very proud of a lot of achievements in 
the UN …146
Indeed, Lebanon was a member of the eight-person drafting committee for the UDHR, 
an accomplishment that was also emphasized during Lebanon’s candidacy to the UN 
Human Rights Council in 2006:
Lebanon has consistently contributed towards the development of a balanced, 
fair and effective international human rights system that works for the promo-
tion and protection of all human rights through dialogue, cooperation, capacity-
building, and technical cooperation. Lebanon played a key role in the elaboration 
of the Universal Declaration through a leading Lebanese figure, Dr. Charles 
Malik, who chaired the UN Commission on Human Rights for two consecutive 
terms (1951–1952).147
Lebanon’s long relationship with the UN human rights system is also reflected in the 
preamble to the Lebanese Constitution, which states that:
Lebanon is also a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization 
and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without 
exception.148
However, as mentioned above, while Lebanon has signed a number of international 
human rights law instruments that constitutionally take precedence over national law, 
their principles are seldom practised in domestic courts.
On other occasions, some have argued, Lebanon goes beyond what would be 
required of them as a party to the 1951 Convention. As one government official 
explained, ‘Lebanon’s international commitments to refugees go beyond the matter of 
signing the Convention and Protocol’.149 Another insisted:
146 UNHCR official, Beirut, 17 May 2016.
147 Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN (n 133).
148 Preamble, para (B).
149 Government official, Beirut, 10 June 2016.
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Lebanon is in fact more generous than the 1951 Refugee Convention: according 
to the Refugee Convention, refugees are allowed to work first after three years. 
The Lebanese government allows refugees to work as soon as they arrive, at least 
in these three sectors: cleaning, construction, agriculture.150
4.4.3 The global ‘crisis’ of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
Finally, many Lebanese decision makers consider the 1951 Refugee Convention redun-
dant due to recent global developments in which many States appear to reject the 
Convention altogether. International refugee law is in crisis, many would argue, and calls 
to scrap or reform the Refugee Convention have been widely made.151 This, as well as 
European countries’ deterrent policies – including the erection of barbed wire fences and 
the passing of more restrictive domestic refugee and asylum legislation – has not gone 
unnoticed in Lebanon. Lebanese media had almost daily coverage of Europe’s refugee 
‘crisis’ in 2015. Speaking to the CERD Committee in August 2015, the Lebanese represen-
tative made apparent reference to the situation: ‘The Lebanese Government … respected 
the principle of non-refoulement and it was not erecting walls or barbed-wire fences’.152
The perceived crisis in international refugee law has been used to justify Lebanon’s 
non-ratification of the Refugee Convention. A  government official referred to the 
situation in Europe when asked about non-ratification, and claimed that ‘even’ 
Scandinavian countries now consider the Refugee Convention outdated: ‘If they think 
so, why should Lebanon become a party?’.153 It is clear that developments in Europe and 
elsewhere have influenced Lebanese perceptions about the importance and advantages 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and have provided justification for not becoming a 
party to this core refugee protection instrument.
5 .  C O N C L U S I O N S
This article has explored how Lebanon seeks to legitimize its rejection of the 1951 
Refugee Convention. It has shown that there are many paradoxes in the behaviour of 
Lebanon towards refugees. On the one hand, it engaged actively in the establishment 
of the international refugee regime, and has been a member of UNHCR’s Executive 
Committee since 1963. It hosts the highest number of refugees per capita in the world, 
and – although it often fails to safeguard the rights of refugees present in the country – 
its approach to refugees has often been lauded by the international community. Yet, on 
150 Government official, Beirut, 18 April 2016. However, what the official failed to disclose is that 
this permission to work generally only relates to the informal labour market; very few Syrians in 
Lebanon have been granted formal work permits since 2011. Also, it is an inaccurate reading of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention’s art 17(2). See Hathaway (n 83) 747.
151 K Siegfried, ‘Has the Refugee Convention Outlived Its Usefulness?’ (IRIN News, 26 March 
2012)  <http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2012/03/26/has-refugee-convention-outlived-its-
usefulness> accessed 25 October 2016; ‘Time to Reform the Way We Protect Refugees?’ (IRIN 
News, 9 May 2016)  <http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/05/09/time-reform-way-we-
protect-refugees> accessed 25 October 2016.
152 UN doc CERD/C/SR.2463 (2016) (emphasis added).
153 Government official, Beirut, 18 June 2016.
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the other hand, Lebanon insists that it is not a country of asylum, and rejects, in prin-
ciple, the local integration of refugees.
The article has provided four examples of how Lebanon legitimizes its non-ratifica-
tion of the 1951 Refugee Convention. First, there is widespread uncertainty and mis-
understanding as to the obligations that come with the Convention, including a belief 
that the Convention would require Lebanon to allow permanent settlement of refugees 
on its territory. While such misunderstandings may sometimes be genuine, it is argu-
able that in many cases they are simply politically expedient; Lebanese political elites 
use opposition to the Convention as a source for political consensus and mobilization. 
Secondly, shifting the responsibility for refugees to third parties, such as UNHCR, has 
made Lebanon less inclined to become a party to the Convention. Thirdly, the ‘good-
neighbourliness’ argument means that Lebanon rejects the term ‘refugee’, to avoid 
being put in positions that could violate the good neighbour principle. Finally, many 
Lebanese government officials and policymakers simply consider Lebanon’s accession 
to the Convention redundant.
Lebanon’s blatant ‘rejection’ of international refugee law places UNHCR and other 
refugee protection actors in a challenging position. This article has explored how, while 
UNHCR has chosen to adopt a ‘pragmatic but principled’ approach to avoid pressur-
ing Lebanon into ratifying international refugee law instruments, as long as the coun-
try provides de facto protection to refugees, such pressure has increasingly come from 
other UN human rights bodies. Future research could therefore concentrate more pre-
cisely on the actual benefits of treaty ratification for strengthening refugee protection 
in Lebanon (and in other non-signatory States). Treaty ratification might increase the 
normative strength of obligations towards refugees, as well as shifting the underlying 
responsibility for refugees in Lebanon from UNHCR to the State. However, UNHCR’s 
current focus on creating a politically negotiated and, therefore, pragmatic ‘protec-
tion space’ for refugees in Lebanon, rather than on persuading Lebanon to ratify the 
Convention, as well as Lebanon’s perception that Contracting States do not necessar-
ily offer better practice than non-signatory States, suggests that this issue is far from 
straightforward.
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